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THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION PARTY ORGANIZATION

IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY-BUILDING TASKS

FROM 1961 TO 1975

**SUMMARY OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATION SPECIALIZATION:
HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM**

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INTRODUCTION

1. Reason for Choosing the Dissertation Topic

The Southwestern Region Party Committee was a regional-level leadership body within the organizational system of the Party during the resistance war against the United States for national salvation. From 1961 to 1975, it assumed leadership of the resistance across eight provinces: Vĩnh Long, Tra Vinh (now part of Vinh Long Province); Can Tho, Soc Trăng (now part of Can Tho City); Ca Mau, Bac Lieu (in 1964, half merged into Ca Mau and half into Soc Trang, until November 1973 when the Southwestern Regional Committee re-established Bac Lieu Province, now part of Ca Mau); Rach Gia (renamed Kien Giang after 1975, now part of An Giang); and Chau Ha Province (established in April 1971 from districts of An Giang and Rach Gia, dissolved after 1975 with districts returned to their original provinces).

Geographically, the Southwestern Region bordered Cambodia to the west by land. Its maritime zone lay to the southwest of the East Sea, with the Philippines to the east, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to the south and southeast, and Thailand and Cambodia to the west and southwest. The terrain was predominantly delta, formed by the alluvial deposits of the Tien River and Hau River, interlaced with a dense canal system. As the last region to be reclaimed and settled, it became home to diverse ethnic groups and multiple indigenous and imported religions. These characteristics gave the Southwestern Region a particularly strategic position in economic, political, diplomatic, defense, security, and socio-cultural terms.

During the U.S. imperialist invasion and implementation of the “neo-colonialism” strategy, the Southwestern Region was designated as a “buffer zone” to protect Saigon from the southwest, while also serving as a source of manpower and resources for the puppet regime. It became a “priority area” for pacification policies, with numerous coercive and deceptive measures—seduction, repression, isolation, and terror—aimed at uprooting the population, suppressing, and eliminating revolutionary forces.

Throughout its 15 years of existence and activity (1961 - 1975), the Southwestern Region Party Committee carried out the tasks of Party-building, leadership, and organization of the resistance in a vast delta region of strategic importance, under conditions far from the Central leadership. The battlefield was fragmented by geography, ethnicity, and religion, and constantly subjected to severe repression and destructive attacks. At times, the revolution faced extreme difficulties when grassroots Party organizations were dismantled and many cadres and members were arrested or killed. Nevertheless, by adhering

to Party-building principles, following the Party's line, under the direct leadership of the Central Office for South Vietnam, and adapting to local realities, the Southwestern Region Party Committee successfully strengthened its organization comprehensively, meeting the demands of leadership and guiding the resistance to victory.

Studying and summarizing the process of Party-building in this region clarifies its position, role, contributions, successes, and limitations, while drawing lessons of experience. This has particular significance: it enriches the history of Party-building and the revolutionary history of Vietnam under Party leadership; provides scientific and practical arguments; and offers valuable lessons for current Party-building and rectification. Historically, it is also an act of responsibility and gratitude to generations of cadres, Party members, and people of the Southwestern Region for their sacrifices for the Party's ideals and national reunification.

Surveys show that while many studies have addressed Party-building in the Southwestern Region from different perspectives and scopes, none has systematically, comprehensively, and deeply examined the process by which the Regional Party Committee carried out Party-building tasks.

For these reasons, the doctoral candidate has chosen the topic: *“The Southwestern Region Party Committee and the Implementation of Party-Building Tasks from 1961 to 1975”*

2. Objectives and Tasks of the Dissertation

2.1. Research Objectives

To clarify the process by which the Southwestern Region Party Committee implemented Party-building tasks from 1961 to 1975; to draw lessons from Party-building work in the Southwestern Region during the resistance against U.S. aggression, with values applicable to current Party-building efforts.

2.2. Research Tasks

Firstly, to systematize published works related to the topic.

Secondly, to study the factors influencing the Party-building process of the Southwestern Region Party Committee from 1961 to 1975.

Thirdly, to reconstruct the Party Committee's Party-building process in terms of politics, ideology, and organization.

Fourth, to clarify its characteristics, successes, and limitations.

Fifth, to summarize lessons from Party-building in the Southwestern Region during the resistance against the United States, with values applicable to present-day Party-building.

3. Research Subjects and Scope

3.1. Research Object

The process by which the Southwestern Region Party Committee carried out Party-building tasks during 1961-1975.

3.2. Research Scope

Content: Party-building tasks in the fields of politics, ideology, and organization.

Space: Research covers eight provinces: Vinh Long, Tra Vinh (as of July 1, 2025 part of Vinh Long Province); Can Tho, Soc Trang (as of July 1, 2025 part of Can Tho City); Ca Mau, Bac Lieu (as of July 1, 2025 part of Ca Mau Province); Chau Ha (established April 1971, after 1975 part of An Giang Province); and Rach Gia (as of July 1, 2025 part of An Giang Province).

Time: From 1961 to 1975.

4. Theoretical Foundations, Research Methods, and Sources

4.1. Theoretical Basis

The dissertation is grounded in historical materialism and dialectical materialism of Marxism-Leninism, Hồ Chí Minh's thought on Party-building, and the Party's viewpoints on Party-building.

4.2. Research Methods

The dissertation primarily employs historical and logical methods, combined with statistical, analytical, synthetic, and comparative approaches. Specifically:

Historical Method: Events of Party-building in the Southwestern Region are reconstructed chronologically, situated in specific contexts, and analyzed objectively based on verified sources, while considering external influences.

Logical Method: Based on collected data and events, the dissertation systematizes and evaluates issues to identify patterns and rules in Party-building under wartime conditions.

Statistical Method: Applied in two ways: (1) Using archival sources and scientific works to establish systematic evidence supporting arguments and evaluations; (2) Verifying data and events to ensure reliability and scientific accuracy in analyzing Party-building tasks.

Analytical and Synthetic Methods: Used to examine specific issues (policy formulation, task identification, leadership, organization of implementation), analyze the development of Party-building in the Southwestern Region in its specific contexts, and synthesize findings for comprehensive conclusions.

Comparative Method: Applied to identify similarities, differences, and distinctive features across phases and areas within the Southwestern Region, and to compare Party-building there with other regions in Southern Vietnam during the resistance against the United States.

5. New Contributions of the Dissertation

5.1. Scientific Contributions

The dissertation provides a comprehensive systematization of the process of Party-building in the Southwestern Region Party Committee from 1961 to 1975, across political, ideological, and organizational dimensions. It distills lessons from Party-building at the regional level in a fragmented river-delta environment, characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, geographical distance from the Central leadership, and direct confrontation with severe repression and terror under the neo-colonial regime during 1961 - 1975.

5.2. Practical Contributions

The dissertation contributes to reconstructing the Party-building process in the Southwestern Region during 1961 - 1975, focusing on:

Organizational work to disseminate and implement Party policies and resolutions.

Identification of political tasks suited to specific conditions, linked with leadership and organization of the resistance.

Education, training, and strengthening of cadres and Party members' political capacity, tied to building unity within the organization.

Building, consolidating, and expanding grassroots Party organizations, enhancing their leadership capacity in the resistance.

Establishing the Party's "political base" and conditions for organizational survival, development, and maintenance of direct, comprehensive, and continuous leadership under constant enemy repression and attacks.

6. Theoretical and Practical Significance

6.1. Theoretical Significance

The dissertation contributes to summarizing and deepening theoretical issues and principles of Party-building, and the implementation of Party-building tasks in regions with distinctive natural, historical, cultural, and social conditions during wartime and direct confrontation with foreign aggression.

It reaffirms the contributions of the Communist Party of Vietnam throughout national history, thereby underscoring the Party's leadership and ruling role as decisive and indispensable for the victories of the Vietnamese revolution.

6.2. Practical Significance

By studying the socio-historical particularities and lessons from Party-building in the Southwestern Region during the resistance against the United States, the dissertation provides scientific arguments applicable to current Party-building and rectification in local Party Committees in the region. Its findings serve as a useful reference for research, propaganda, and teaching of Party history at the local level.

7. Structure of the Dissertation

In addition to the Introduction, Conclusion, References, and Appendices, the dissertation consists of 4 chapters with 8 sections:

Chapter 1. Overview of research related to the dissertation.

Chapter 2. The Southwestern Region Party Committee's Party-building tasks, 1961 - 1968.

Chapter 3. Party-building and leadership of the resistance to victory, 1969 - 1975.

Chapter 4. Observations and lessons.

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH WORKS RELATED TO THE DISSERTATION

1.1. RELATED RESEARCH WORKS

1.1.1. Studies by Foreign Scholars

Memoirs by Lyndon Johnson, Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London), translated and published by Vietnam News Agency, 1972 [218]. *A Soldier Reports* by William C. Westmoreland, translated and published by Trẻ Publishing House, Ho Chi Minh City, 1988 [223]. *Vietnam: The ten Thousand day war* by Michael Maclear, translated and published by Su That Publishing House, 1990 [219]. *Anatomy of a War* by Gabriel Kolko, translated and published by People's Army Publishing House, 1991 [215]. *Secrets of the Vietnam war* by Philip B. Davidson, translated and published by National Political Publishing House, 1995 [221]. *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* by Robert S. McNamara, translated and published by National Political Publishing House, 1995 [222]. *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* by Ilya V. Gaiduk, translated and published by People's Public Security Publishing House, 1996 [217]. *America's Longest War* by George C. Herring, translated and published by National Political Publishing House, 1998 [216]. *A Bright Shining Lie* by Neil Sheehan, translated and published by People's Public Security Publishing House, 2003 [220].

Other notable foreign-language works include: *Defeating communist insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, Sir Robert Thompson, Chatto and Windus Press, London, 1965 [227]. *Deadly deceits - My, 25 years in the CIA*, Ralph W. Mc Gehee, Sheridan Square publication Inc, New York, 1983 [226]. *Why did the strategic hamlet program fail?*, Peter Francis Leahy, the Thesis of Master of Military art and science, New South Wales University, Australia, 1990 [225]. *Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975: the Military History Institute of Vietnam* University Press of Kannas [229]. *The Vietnamese war: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975*, David W.P. Elliott, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2003 [224]. *Vietnamese Communism In Comparative Perspective*, William S Turley, Taylor & Francis, 2019 [230].

1.1.2. Studies by Domestic Scholars

1.1.2.1. *Group of Studies on the History of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the History of Party-Building*

History of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Vol. 2 (1954 - 1975), compiled by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995 [78]. *History of Party Work and Political Work in Campaigns during the Resistance against the French and the Americans (1945 - 1975)*, published by the Vietnam Military History Institute, 1998 [210]. *Draft Outline of the History of the Party's Ideological Work, 1930 - 2000*, compiled by the Central Ideology and Culture Commission, National Political Publishing House, 2000 [26]. *History of Organizational Work of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1930 - 2000)*, edited by Nguyen Huu Tri and Nguyen Thi Phuong Hong, National Political Publishing House, 2004 [197]. The work *The Communist Party of Vietnam: Fundamental Issues of Party Building* by Prof. Dr. Mach Quang Thang, published by Labour Publishing House in 2007 [188]. *Chronological History of the Southern Regional Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam (1954 - 1975)*, second revised and supplemented edition, compiled by the Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, edited by Prof. Dr. Trinh Nhu, published by the National Political Publishing House in 2008 [76]. *History of the Southern Regional Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam (1954 - 1975)*, authored by a collective of scholars from the Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, edited by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Quy, published, 2010 [77]. *History of Party-building work (1930 - 2011)* by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Trong Phuc, published by the National Political Publishing House, 2012 [182]. *Chronicle of Historical Events of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, compiled by the Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, published, 2021 [80]. *The Historical Process of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1930-2021)* by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ngo Dang Tri, Information and Communications Publishing House in 2022 [192].

Doctoral dissertations: *Party-Building Work in the Southern Party Committee from July 1954 to October 1961* by Nguyen Binh, defended at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, 2009 [37]. *Party-Building Work of the Party Committee of Interzone V from 1949 to 1961* by Nguyen Quang Hoa, defended at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, 2023 [75].

Doctoral dissertations: “*Party-Building Work in the Southern Party Committee from July 1954 to October 1961*” by Nguyen Binh, defended at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, 2009

[37]. “*Party-Building Work of the Party Committee of Interzone V from 1949 to 1961*” by Nguyen Quang Hoa, defended at the Hồ Chí Minh National Academy of Politics, 2023 [75].

1.1.2.2. Group of Research Works on the Resistance War against the United States in the South with Reference to Party Building Tasks

Representative works include: *Letters to the South*, published by Truth Publishing House in 1985 [42]; *Summary of the Resistance War against the United States, for National Salvation: Victories and Lessons*, compiled by the War Review Steering Committee under the Politburo, published by National Political Publishing House in 1995 [20]; *Vietnam’s Revolutionary War (1945–1975): Victories and Lessons*, compiled by the War Review Steering Committee under the Politburo, published in 2000 [21]; *Summary of Propaganda and Mobilization Work in the Resistance War against the United States (1954 - 1975)*, compiled by the General Political Department, published by People’s Army Publishing House in 2002 [193]; *The Party’s Leadership in the Struggle against the “Strategic Hamlet” Policy of the U.S. - Saigon Regime in South Vietnam (1961 - 1975)*, authored by Tran Thi Thu Huong, published in 2003 [86]; *Under One Banner (On the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam)*, published by Ho Chi Minh National Political Publishing House in 2010 [179]; *History of the Southern Resistance and Chronology of Events in the Southern Resistance*, compiled by the Steering Council for the Compilation of Southern Resistance History, published in 2010 [83, pp.1093-1094]; *History of Vietnam*, compiled by the Institute of History under the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, published by Social Sciences Publishing House in 2017, with volumes 12 (1954 - 1965) and 13 (1965 - 1975) addressing the resistance war against the United States [208, 209]; and *Summary of the Party’s Leadership in Military and National Defense during the Vietnamese Revolution (1945 - 2000)*, compiled by the Ministry of National Defense and the War Review Steering Committee, published by People’s Army Publishing House in 2021 [31].

1.1.2.3. Group of Works on Resistance History, Sectoral History, and Local Party History in the Southwestern Region

The work *Military Zone 9: Thirty Years of Resistance (1945 - 1975)*, researched and compiled by the Command of Military Zone 9, was published by the People’s Army Publishing House in 1996 [35]. The study *Summary of Local People’s War*, with the theme of combining the “two-legged, three-pronged” strategy across three strategic zones in the resistance against U.S. imperialism in Military Zone 9 (1954 - 1975), was compiled by the General

Staff and published in 2001 [32]. *History of Party and Political Work in the Armed Forces of Military Zone 9 (1945 - 2005)* was compiled by the Party Committee and Command of Military Zone 9, published in 2009 [67]. Two works titled *Southwestern Region: Thirty Years of Resistance* were compiled by the Southwestern Region Tradition Editorial Board and published in 2000 [22]; *History of the Southwestern Resistance*, revised and supplemented with new sources and events, in three volumes: Vol. 1 (1945 - 1954), Vol. 2 (1955 - 1969), Vol. 3 (1969 - 1975), published by the National Political Publishing House in 2010 [1, 2, 3]. *History of the Party Committee of Military Zone 9 (1947 - 2007)* was compiled by the Party Committee of Military Zone 9 and published in 2010 [68].

Doctoral dissertations include: *The Movement to Dismantle Strategic Hamlets in the Southwestern Region (1961 - 1965)* by Pham Duc Thuan, defended at Hue University in 2017 [190]; and *The Southwestern Regional Party Committee's Leadership of the Political Struggle Movement, 1965 - 1975* by Nguyen Bich Thuy, defended at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics in 2023 [191].

Several research articles also touch upon Party-building tasks in the region, such as: "Receiving Central Aid to the Southwestern Region via Transport Route 1C during the Resistance against the U.S." by Ly Ngoc Dinh (*Military History Journal*, No. 11-2009) [70]; "Countering Pacification and Encroachment after the Paris Agreement in the Southwestern Region" by Nguyen Minh Phung (*Military History Journal*, No. 2-2013) [183]; "Communal and Hamlet Combat in the Southwestern Region during the Resistance against the U.S." by Ly Kim Cuong (*Military History Journal*, No. 4-2014) [40]; and "Propaganda and Education Work in the Resistance against the U.S. in Tra Vinh" by Tran Binh Trong [196].

A number of Party history works, summaries of Party-building, and revolutionary tradition histories of local people and armed forces also address the organization and leadership of Party-building by the Southwestern Regional Party Committee for local Party Committees. Representative works include: *Hau Giang: 21 Years of Resistance against the United States*, compiled by the Executive Committee of the Hau Giang Provincial Party Committee, published by Hau Giang General Publishing House in 1987 [61]; *History of the Bac Lieu Provincial Party Organization*, Vol. 1 (1927 - 1975), compiled and published by the Executive Committee of the Bac Lieu Provincial Party Committee in 2002 [4]; *History of the Ca Mau Provincial Party Organization*, Vol. 1 (1930 - 1975), compiled by the Executive Committee of the Ca Mau Provincial Party

Committee, published by Mui Ca Mau Publishing House in 2004 [64]; *History of Tra Vinh*, Vol. 3 (1954 - 1975), directed by the Tra Vinh Provincial Party Committee and People's Committee, compiled and published by the Provincial Party Committee's Ideology and Culture Commission in 2005 [195]; *Kien Giang in the Resistance against the United States (1954 - 1975)*, compiled by the Kien Giang Provincial Party Committee, published by Past & Present Journal and Saigon Culture Publishing House in 2008 [194]; *History of the Vinh Long Provincial Party Organization (1930 - 2010)*, published by the National Political Truth Publishing House in 2015 [7]; *History of the Soc Trang Provincial Party Organization*, Vol. II (1954 - 1975), compiled and published (second revised and supplemented edition) by the Executive Committee of the Soc Trang Provincial Party Committee in 2019 [6]. *History of the Can Tho Municipal Party Organization*, Vol. III (1954 - 1975), published by the National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, in 2020 [62]."

1.2. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY IN THE DISSERTATION

1.2.1. Evaluation of Research Results from Related Scientific Works

1.2.1.1. Research by Foreign Scholars

Regarding works authored by foreign researchers, experts, military advisers, or veterans who participated in the Southern Vietnam battlefield, their evaluations generally follow two main approaches: 1- Based on sources collected concerning the gradual involvement, intervention, and direct participation of the United States in the war. 2- Reflections drawn from the lived realities of the Vietnam War and its consequences. Based on these two approaches, the authors have provided individual assessments regarding the impacts, and consequences of the Vietnam War from their own perspectives

Some studies surveyed the views, interpretations, and explanations of researchers, scientists, and politicians regarding the origins of the conflict and the causes of U.S. failure (Gabriel Kolko, Michael Maclear). Others highlighted mistakes and, from various angles, approached the deceptive and unjust nature of U.S. involvement as the root of defeat (Philip B. Davidson, Daniel Ellsberg, Ralph W. McGehee), thereby presenting individual conclusions.

A group of works by politicians and generals who had participated in planning and implementing U.S. neo-colonial policies in Vietnam were mainly conveyed in the form of memoirs. In terms of content, these works analyzed and reassessed decisions, policies, strategies, and methods of warfare; they examined factors influencing such decisions (William C. Westmoreland).

Some studies explained U.S. failure as stemming from subjectivity or errors in implementation of strategies and tactics, or from a lack of objective support, while noting that the Communist Party of Vietnam benefited from effective assistance from allied countries (Sir Robert Thompson, Peter Francis Leahy, Ilya V. Gaiduk). These accounts often deliberately overlooked the decisive leadership role of the Communist Party of Vietnam. A few studies acknowledged U.S. subjectivity, including insufficient understanding of Vietnam, as a cause of failure in the “Vietnam War” (L. Johnson, Robert S. McNamara).

From a historiographical perspective, foreign authors’ research provides new sources and specific data, contributing to a more multi-dimensional evaluation of the nature of historical events. At the same time, these works reflect characteristics of international relations, U.S. policies, and the tactics of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), which posed major challenges and difficulties for the leadership and direction of the resistance movement in general, and for the Party-building tasks of Party organizations in the South, including the Southwestern Region, in particular.

1.2.1.2. Research Works in Vietnam

Domestic research works emphasize the position and role of Party-building as the core, decisive, and permanent factor ensuring the continuous growth of the Party, commensurate with the historic mission entrusted by the nation. Party-building is identified as the decisive element in achieving victory in the resistance against U.S. aggression, completing the liberation of the South, and reunifying the country. This is reflected in several fundamental aspects:

Firstly, these works contribute to reconstructing the heroic historical panorama of the nation in the resistance war under the Party’s leadership. They help re-establish the history of the Party’s formation, policy development, and refinement of revolutionary leadership lines; the building and consolidation of the Communist Party’s organizational system under wartime conditions. They affirm the Party’s leadership role, its intellectual capacity, and strategic vision, expressed through policies, decisions, methods, and leadership art at each stage and turning point, guiding the revolution through difficulties toward victory.

Secondly, some studies highlight aspects of Party-building such as principles, content, tasks, and methods. They stress that strengthening Party organizations to lead the resistance was a prerequisite for the Party’s growth at all levels—from the Central Committee to local branches, sectors, and grassroots

units. Certain works clarify Party-building tasks in political, ideological, and organizational dimensions.

Thirdly, many works reflect how Party committees at each stage of the resistance promptly introduced policies and solutions to improve political and ideological education for cadres and members; to prevent and correct deviations such as dogmatism, subjectivism, arrogance, or discouragement. Local Party committees mobilized patriotism, unity, and the aspiration for independence and reunification among cadres, members, and the people. They focused on consolidating Party organizations, expanding membership in liberated zones and areas behind enemy lines, while improving the quality of Party members to ensure continuous and effective leadership across all fronts.

Fourth, local Party histories, sectoral histories, and studies of revolutionary movements in the Southwestern Region also reflect, to varying degrees, the Party-building tasks of local Party committees between 1961 and 1975. Through their assigned functions and tasks, Party committees adhered to Party-building principles, strictly implemented the Party's Platform, Statutes, and policies, as well as directives from the Central Office for South Vietnam and the Southwestern Regional Party Committee. Grassroots Party organizations acted as nuclei of leadership, rallying the masses to secure victory in local resistance tasks.

On the basis of an overview of relevant domestic and international studies, the dissertation selectively inherits the following aspects:

The first, it adopts the methodological foundations of historical science, Party history, and the history of Party building; including approaches, methods of data collection, synthesis, and analysis, as well as scientific arguments and theses.

The second, it draws upon verified sources. Previous research has provided a rich body of materials from diverse channels and categories, particularly concerning Party-building work in general and the tasks of Party building in the Southwestern region in particular. These constitute valuable sources for the dissertation to inherit, select, exploit, and utilize in its own research.

The third, it builds upon the research findings of established scientific works. The inheritance of results that have been verified and appraised is a significant advantage in the implementation of the dissertation. At the same time, the overview of prior studies suggests new approaches and expands the research framework to different dimensions of Party-building tasks in general,

and in the Southwestern region in particular-areas that earlier studies have only partially addressed or not yet examined.

1.2.2. Issues for Further Research and Clarification

From the overview of related studies, it is evident that no work has yet identified the Party Committee of the Southwestern Region as the subject of research in relation to its implementation of Party-building tasks during 1961–1975. Nor has any study systematically and comprehensively examined the process by which the Southwestern Party Committee carried out Party-building across all three dimensions-political, ideological, and organizational; the subjective and objective conditions influencing this process; or the Committee’s proactive and creative role. Likewise, no research has summarized the experiences of the Southwestern Party Committee in leading and organizing the implementation of Party-building tasks.

On the basis of these gaps, the dissertation focuses on the following issues:

Firstly, analyzing the factors that influenced the Party-building process of the Southwestern Party Committee during 1961 - 1975, with particular attention to distinctive elements that directly affected its tasks.

Secondly, systematizing and generalizing the Party’s policies-specifically those of the Central Office for South Vietnam-on Party building; clarifying the process of dissemination, policy formulation, content, and outcomes achieved by the Southwestern Party Committee in implementing Party-building tasks across political, ideological, and organizational dimensions within its assigned area during 1961 - 1975.

Thirdly, identifying the strengths and limitations, as well as the causes underlying them, in the Party-building process of the Southwestern Party Committee during 1961- 1975.

Fourthly, distilling key experiences from the Southwestern Party Committee’s Party-building efforts between 1961 and 1975, which hold practical value for the implementation of Party-building tasks in the present period.

Chapter 2

THE SOUTHWESTERN PARTY COMMITTEE IN IMPLEMENTING PARTY-BUILDING TASKS (1961 - 1968)

2.1. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PARTY - BUILDING TASKS OF THE SOUTHWESTERN PARTY COMMITTEE (1961 - 1968)

2.1.1. Natural and social characteristics, and the patriotic and revolutionary traditions of the people of the Southwestern region

This section outlines the key features of geographical location, natural conditions, climate, terrain; ethnic composition, population distribution, customs, practices, linguistic psychology, religion, and revolutionary traditions. These distinctive factors directly influenced the formulation of policies and solutions for implementing Party-building tasks in the Southwestern Region.

2.1.2. Context and situation of party-building tasks in the Southwestern region prior to 1961

This section provides an overview of the revolutionary situation in the Southwestern Region after the signing of the Geneva Accords, focusing on issues such as the schemes, tactics, and policies of the United States through its proxy regime under Ngo Dinh Diem; the difficulties in carrying out Party-building tasks; and the organizational losses suffered by the Party as well as the broader revolutionary movement in the Southwestern Region.

2.1.3. The situation in the Southwestern region under the U.S. Strategies of “special war” (1961 - 1965) and “local war” (1965 - 1968)

This section summarizes the main features of the “special war” (1961 - 1965) and “local war” (1965 - 1968) strategies implemented by the United States in the Southwestern Region, thereby identifying specific issues and distinctive characteristics.

2.1.4. The party’s and the Central Office for South Vietnam’s policies on implementing party-building tasks (1961 - 1968)

This section clarifies the strategic directives, orientations, and guidance of the Party Central Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam in leading the implementation of Party-building tasks. These served as the crucial foundation for the Southwestern Party Committee to define its tasks, solutions,

and organizational measures in carrying out Party-building responsibilities in the region.

2.2. THE SOUTHWESTERN PARTY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTING PARTY-BUILDING TASKS (1961 - 1968)

2.2.1. Establishment of the Party Organization of the Southwestern Region

This section clarifies the changes in U.S. implementation of the neo-colonial war strategy, the urgent requirements for establishing the Southwestern Regional Party Committee-the highest regional Party organ responsible for leading Party-building tasks in the area. It highlights the necessity of strengthening and promoting the leadership role of the regional Party organ in the Southwest, enhancing its capacity and effectiveness in directing the resistance, and ensuring leadership over a strategically vital region of the nation-an essential factor determining the success of all revolutionary tasks in the area.

2.2.2. The Southwestern Party Committee implementing party-building tasks (1961 - 1968)

2.2.2.1. Building the Party Organization Politically

This section focuses on clarifying the political dimensions of Party-building: identifying revolutionary targets and the opponent's strategic solutions; defining policies, tasks, and measures in leadership and organization; building forces; establishing bases; and directing the coordination of different fronts of struggle (political, military, and propaganda among enemy troops).

2.2.2.2. Ideological Development of the Party Organization

This section emphasizes strengthening confidence, maintaining revolutionary positions, and overcoming manifestations of division, resignation, lack of determination, individualism, leftist deviation, dogmatism, subjectivism, and impatience among cadres and Party members. It also highlights solutions in education and propaganda work to consolidate unity of will and revolutionary action throughout the Party Committee.

2.2.2.3. Organizational Development of the Party Organization

This section clarifies the consolidation and strengthening of organizational systems from the regional level down to the grassroots across the Party Committee. It addresses: organizational consolidation, assignment of

key leadership roles at the regional level; establishing coordination mechanisms between the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region Party Committee; between the Regional Committee and Provincial/City Committees; between the Military Region Committee and regional departments; leadership within vertical systems of departments (army, security, propaganda, etc.); consolidation of organizational structures and methods; assignment and deployment of cadres at regional, provincial, and district levels to strengthen grassroots leadership; organization and activities of grassroots Party cells; and the development of Party organizations across localities and the entire region during 1961 - 1968.

Chapter 3
THE SOUTHWESTERN REGIONAL PARTY
ORGANIZATION PROMOTES THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF PARTY-BUILDING TASKS TO BRING THE RESISTANCE WAR
TO VICTORY (1969 - 1975)

3.1. TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SITUATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON PARTY-BUILDING TASKS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION (1969 - 1975)

3.1.1. The Southwestern region in the context of the United States implementing the strategy of “Vietnamization of the war”

This section of the dissertation clarifies the strategic adjustments undertaken by the united states through economic, political, and military measures, and their impact on the process of party-building and revolutionary leadership in the southwestern region (1969 - 1975). particular attention is given to the modifications in “pacification” measures (scale, degree, and character), the construction of systems of control, the organization of forces, and the consequences of these developments for the party committee’s party-building tasks.

3.1.2. The Party’s policy and the leadership of the Central Office for South Vietnam regarding party-building work

This section of the dissertation summarizes the fundamental and core issues in the leadership and guidance provided by the central committee and the southern central office through resolutions, projects, directives, circulars, guidelines, telegrams, and letters related to the organization and implementation of party-building tasks. these were crucial foundations that enabled the regional party committee to translate them into specific orientations, tasks, and solutions, thereby ensuring the successful execution of party-building responsibilities in response to the demands of the revolution in the region.

3.2. THE PARTY ORGANIZATION OF THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION INTENSIFYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY-BUILDING TASKS (1969 - 1975)

3.2.1. Building the Party Organization Politically

This section continues to analyze and clarify the Party Committee’s policies and solutions in defining orientations, tasks, principles, guidelines, and measures: building forces; establishing bases; directing the coordination of different fronts of struggle... to defeat all “pacification” plans of the enemy.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Party Committee focused on major issues such as building government structures in liberated areas; organizing bases, building forces, and developing movements in enemy-occupied and contested zones; strengthening the comprehensive revolutionary potential; and ultimately defeating the U.S. “Vietnamization of the war” strategy, thereby contributing to the complete liberation of the South and national reunification.

3.2.2. Ideological Development of the Party Organization

This section clarifies the Party Committee’s efforts to overcome and prevent manifestations of “defensiveness” and “seeking safety” after the Tet Offensive; ideological problems arising among some cadres and Party members once the revolution had achieved significant results, especially after the Paris Agreement—such as arrogance, complacency, lack of political determination, ideological laxity, leftist deviation, and localism. It highlights solutions in education and propaganda to strengthen confidence and revolutionary positions among cadres and Party members; fostering and promoting unity of will and revolutionary action throughout the Party Committee as the foundation and driving force for successfully accomplishing political tasks.

3.2.3. Organizational Development of the Party Organization

This section continues to clarify the consolidation, construction, and strengthening of organizational systems from the regional level down to the grassroots across the Party Committee. It addresses: deployment, supplementation, and assignment of key leadership roles at the regional level; improvement of coordination mechanisms between the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region Party Committee; between the Regional Committee and regional departments and Provincial/City Committees; between the Military Region Committee and regional departments; consolidation of organizational structures and methods; assignment of tasks to departments and localities; building “core forces” to lead movements; development of organizational structures and operational methods of grassroots Party cells in specific areas. It also highlights the work of organizational development and Party expansion across localities and the entire region during 1969 - 1975.

Chapter 4

REMARKS AND EXPERIENCES

4.1. REMARKS

4.1.1. Advantages and Causes

4.1.1.1. *Strengths*

Firstly, the Party Committee consistently ensured the absolute, direct, comprehensive, and continuous leadership of the Party over the development of the revolutionary movement in the region.

Secondly, the Party Committee always attached importance to political and ideological education, thereby safeguarding the revolutionary character of cadres and Party members, while consolidating unity and cohesion throughout the Committee.

Thirdly, the Party's organizational system was regularly consolidated, expanded, and perfected to meet the requirements of leading the resistance.

4.1.1.2. *Causes of Strengths*

Firstly, throughout the process of Party building, the Party Committee consistently received close, regular, and timely attention and guidance from the Central Party, directly from the Central Office for South Vietnam.

Secondly, in carrying out Party building tasks, the Southwestern Regional Party Committee strictly adhered to the principles of scientific and revolutionary Party construction, as well as the Party's leadership line.

Thirdly, in implementing Party building, the Committee thoroughly grasped the principle of maintaining close ties with the people, regarding this as the key factor in protecting and sustaining Party forces and activities.

Fourth, the Committee effectively conducted propaganda, mobilization, and enlightenment of the masses, fostering unity, building grassroots foundations, and expanding the revolutionary strength.

4.1.2. Limitations and causes

4.1.2.1. *Limitations*

Alongside major, comprehensive achievements, the Party Committee of the Southwestern Region (1961 - 1975) also revealed certain limitations in the process of Party building:

Political: At times when U.S. imperialists shifted strategies, the concretization of Party and Central Office directives into specific political tasks suited to local conditions was not always timely. The dissemination and implementation at grassroots levels in some localities remained slow; leadership was occasionally mechanical and rigid, lacking grounding in practical realities. Coordination among Party committees from regional to

grassroots levels was not consistently effective. Inspection, supervision, and review of resolution implementation were, in certain places and periods, irregular.

Ideological: The work of education, consolidation, and enhancement of ideological awareness and Party stance did not always keep pace with revolutionary developments and leadership demands. Some cadres and members displayed impatience; others were hesitant, seeking safety; a small number lost confidence in revolutionary victory, became pessimistic or wavering, unable to withstand hardship or enemy torture-leading to desertion or even surrender, which caused organizational losses and spread anxiety among the masses. Conversely, at times of revolutionary success, manifestations of subjectivism and complacency emerged, including among key cadres, with signs of “arrogance of merit”, lack of democracy in meetings, and in policy and planning formulation.

Organizational: In its early stage, the Party’s organizational system did not operate in a truly scientific manner. The rebuilding and consolidation of grassroots Party organizations in certain areas-especially enemy-controlled or contested zones after the Tet Offensive-were slow and uneven. Some localities experienced “white communes” without Party cells, with shortages of Party members to oversee areas. The capacity for autonomous work and leadership of movements in some Party cells remained limited.

4.1.2.2. Causes

** Subjective factors:*

Firstly, an undeniable objective reality was that the Vietnamese nation had to wage resistance against an invading “superpower,” which possessed overwhelming strength in all aspects and harbored the determination to conquer South Vietnam at all costs

Secondly, the organization and implementation of strategies, forms, methods, and solutions for the war of aggression by U.S. imperialism represented a “new-style” colonial war-fundamentally different in nature from previous “old-style” wars Its sophistication and insidiousness reached a high degree of perfection through the establishment of puppet governments and armies; sustaining and utilizing these structures with comprehensive aid (economic, financial, weapons, war materiel); training personnel to operate the war machinery; providing legal cover by rallying allies through treaty systems; and directing operations via American advisory networks All of this created a façade to conceal and disguise the essence and acts of aggression.

Thirdly, the Southwestern region was geographically distant from the

Central leadership, so directives from the Central Committee often arrived later than in other areas. Moreover, natural terrain features led to fragmentation among battlefields. As the region was a focal point of the enemy's "pacification policy," this situation partly affected revolutionary leadership and Party-building tasks, especially when seeking guidance from higher-level Party organs.

** Objective factors:*

At certain critical junctures the implementation and organization of tasks at the grassroots level were not sufficiently effective. In leadership and direction, some Party committees, sectors, and local authorities did not always tailor their guidance to the specific conditions and requirements of each area; political tasks were sometimes defined in general terms, lacking practical orientation.

Political education and the consolidation of ideological positions among cadres and Party members were, at times, not truly effective; they lacked systematic and regular implementation under the conditions of prolonged, intense warfare and the enemy's constant strategic adjustments. Particularly during sensitive turning points or periods of revolutionary difficulty, ideological rectification and consolidation were delayed and not thoroughly or comprehensively carried out.

In the early stages after its establishment the organizational structure of the Regional Party Committee was not yet scientific. The operational mechanisms between the Standing Committee and its subordinate departments were not fully effective; in some areas, activities among departments overlapped, leading to inefficiency and duplication.

4.2. SOME EXPERIENCES

Firstly, in carrying out Party-building tasks, Party organizations must strictly observe the principles of Party construction, thoroughly grasp the Party's guidelines and policies, and at the same time base resolutions on specific conditions to ensure appropriateness.

Secondly, Party committees must always pay close attention to ideological work for cadres and Party members.

Thirdly, building and developing organizations must be closely linked with the consolidation and protection of those organizations.

Fourth, consistently pay close attention to building and strengthening solidarity and unity within the Party Committee.

Fifth, always place the interests of the people at the center, continuously strengthen and promote the power of great national unity as the foundation for building a strong Party Committee.

CONCLUSION

1. When the resistance war against the united states in the south transitioned from preserving forces to offensive operations, the united states continued its ambition of imposing new-style colonialism through strategic changes to meet the requirements of leadership, the central committee established the southwestern regional party committee this was a timely and correct decision based on strict adherence to party-building principles, compliance with the party charter, and suited to the practical conditions of the resistance in the region the party committee implemented marxist-leninist principles of party construction, followed the party line and central directives, particularly from the southern central committee, and built the party comprehensively in politics, ideology, and organization while developing cadres to lead the resistance.

2. The southwestern party committee consistently grasped the party line and followed the direct leadership of the southern central committee from october 1961 while adapting to local conditions it was proactive, creative, and timely in defining political tasks, closely linking party-building with the survival of the revolution it led the people to defeat all forms of new-style colonial warfare, including special war 1961 - 1965, limited war 1965-1968, vietnamization 1969 - 1973, and repulsed all interventions and attempts at return 1973 - 1975, contributing to the complete liberation of the south and national reunification.

3. The process of party-building from 1961 to 1975 had certain limitations with high responsibility to the party and the people, these shortcomings were gradually overcome and corrected, providing lessons for party committees and members to avoid errors and to build an increasingly pure and strong party organization.

4. Although tasked with Party-building and directly leading the resistance war in a vast delta region characterized by distinct geographical, historical, and socio-cultural conditions, and directly confronting the United States' neo-colonial policies while being geographically distant from the Central leadership, the Party Organization of the Southwestern Region, nevertheless, successfully fulfilled its responsibilities. This achievement was made possible by its firm adherence to the principles of Party building, its thorough grasp and strict implementation of the Party's line and policies—

particularly those of the Central Office for South Vietnam - and its application of a practice-oriented approach. At the same time, through the simultaneous processes of Party-building and leading the resistance, the Party Organization of the Southwestern Region continuously enriched and further developed the Party's revolutionary line with practical achievements and local leadership experience. The practice of Party-building from 1961 to 1975 left behind valuable lessons in Party organization building, including four key experiences: First, in carrying out Party-building tasks, Party organizations must strictly adhere to the principles of Party building and thoroughly implement the Party's line and policies, while basing resolutions on concrete local conditions to ensure their relevance and feasibility. Second, Party committees must consistently give priority to ideological work among cadres and Party members. Third, organizational development must be closely linked with consolidation and protection of Party organizations. Fourth, consistently pay close attention to building and strengthening solidarity and unity within the Party Committee. Fifth, the interests of the people must always be placed at the center, while continuously strengthening and promoting the great national unity bloc, which serves as the foundation for building a strong Party organization. These experiences were gradually consolidated and effectively applied by the Party Organization of the Southwestern Region in the process of leading and directing the implementation of tasks during the resistance war against the United States for national salvation in the region.

5. The strengths, limitations, and lessons drawn from the Party-building process of the Party Organization of the Southwestern Region possess highly valuable historical, theoretical, and practical significance, which should continue to be studied and inherited in Party-building work in general, as well as in the building of local Party organizations today. In particular, these issues include: the study and formulation of resolutions of local Party organizations; the safeguarding of the Party's absolute leadership and ruling role; the renewal of leadership methods and the enhancement of the Party's leadership and governing capacity; and the construction of the 'people's heart and mind front,' as well as the promotion of the strength and intellect of the people in building and defending the Party, and in building and safeguarding the Fatherland.

LIST OF SCIENTIFIC WORKS RELATED TO THE TOPIC

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